Human embryonic stem cell research: why the discarded-created distinction cannot be based on the potentiality argument

Discussions about the use and derivation of pluripotent human embryonic stem cells are a stumbling block in developing public policy on stem cell research. On the one hand there is a broad consensus on the benefits of these cells for science and biomedicine; on the other hand there is the controversial issue of killing human embryos. I will focus on the compromise position that accepts research on spare embryos, but not on research embryos (‘discarded-created-distinction’, from now on d-c-d). I will point out that this viewpoint is hard to maintain. The main reason is that the ‘revealed beliefs’ of its defenders are inconsistent with their ‘professed beliefs’, more specifically with their main argument, i.e. the potentiality argument. I will point out that (1) the defenders of d-c-d actually grant a relative moral status to the human embryo, (2) this moral status is dependent on internal and external criteria of potentiality, (3) potentiality seen as a variable value that also depends on external criteria cannot justify d-c-d, and (4) an approach to human embryonic stem cell-research that would also allow the use of research embryos is more compatible with the feelings, attitudes and values of those who currently defend d-c-d and, therefore, could lead to a broader consensus and to actions that alleviate
individual human suffering.

The Moral Imperative to Conduct Embryonic Stem Cell and Cloning Research

Published in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2006

What’s in a name? Embryos, entities and ANTities in the stem cell debate

published in Journal of Medical Ethics, 2006

This paper discusses two proposals to the US President’s Council on Bioethics that try to overcome the issue of killing embryos in embryonic stem (ES) cell research and argues that neither of them can hold good as a compromise solution. The author argues that (1) the groups of people for which the compromises are intended neither need nor want the two compromises, (2) the US government and other governments of countries with restrictive regulation on ES cell research have not provided a clear and sound justification to take into account minority views on the protection of human life to such a considerable extent as to constrain the freedom of research in the area of stem cell research, and (3) the best way to deal with these issues is to accept that many people and most governments adopt a gradualist and variable viewpoint on the human embryo which implies that embryos can be sacrificed for good reasons and to try to find other, less constraining, ways to take into account minority views on the embryo. Finally, another more efficient and time and money sparing compromise will be proposed for those who accept IVF, a majority in most societies.

Creating and sacrificing embryos for stem cells

published in Journal of Medical Ethics, 2005

The compromise position that accepts the use and derivation of stem cells from spare in vitro fertilisation embryos but opposes the creation of embryos for these purposes is a very weak ethical position. This paper argues that whatever the basis is on which defenders of this viewpoint accord intrinsic value to the embryo, once they accept the creation and sacrifice of embryos to benefit infertile people with a child-wish, they do not have a sound moral argument to condemn the creation and sacrifice of
embryos to benefit ill and injured people.

Advance directives to protect embryos?

published in Journal of Medical Ethics, 2005

Preimplantation HLA typing: having children to save our loved ones

published in Journal of Medical Ethics, 2005

Preimplantation tissue typing has been proposed as a method for creating a tissue matched child that can serve as a haematopoietic stem cell donor to save its sick sibling in need of a stem cell transplant. Despite recent promising results, many people have expressed their disapproval of this method. This paper addresses the main concerns of these critics: the risk of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for the child to be born; the intention to have a donor child; the limits that should be placed on what may be done to the donor child, and whether the intended recipient can be someone other than a sibling. The author will show that these concerns do not constitute a sufficient ground to forbid people to use this technique to save
not only a sibling, but also any other loved one’s life. Finally, the author briefly deals with two alternative scenarios: the creation of a human leukocyte antigen (HLA) matched child as an insurance policy, and the banking of HLA matched embryos.

THE AMBIGUITY OF THE EMBRYO: ETHICAL INCONSISTENCY IN THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE

Co-authored with John Harris, published in Metaphilosophy, 2007

We argue in this essay that (1) the embryo is an irredeemably
ambiguous entity and its ambiguity casts serious doubt on the arguments claiming its full protection or, at least, protection against its use as a means for stem cell research, (2) those who claim the embryo should be protected as ‘‘one of us’’ are committed to a position even they do not uphold in their practices, (3) views that defend the protection of the embryo in virtue of its potentiality to become a person fail, and (4) the embryo does not have any rights or interests to be protected. Given that many are willing to treat the embryo as a means in other practices, and that human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research holds great potential to benefit many people, one cannot but conclude that hESC research is permissible and, because of its immense promise for alleviating human suffering,
even obligatory.

RESCUING HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH: THE POSSIBILITY OF EMBRYO RECONSTITUTION AFTER STEM CELL DERIVATION

Co-authored with chris M. Ward, published in Metaphilosophy, 2007

We discuss in this essay the alternative techniques proposed for the isolation of human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) that attempt to satisfy moral issues surrounding killing embryos but show that these techniques are either redundant or do not achieve their intended aim. We discuss the difficulties
associated with defining a human embryo and how the lack of clarity on this issue antagonises the ethical debate and impedes hESC research. We present scientific evidence showing that isolation of hESCs does not necessarily ‘‘kill’’ human embryos. In addition, we argue that even those who accord inviolable moral status to the embryo should agree that hESC research is morally obligatory, as it is beneficial to the developmental potential of the embryo and society as a whole.

COMPROMISE AND MORAL COMPLICITY IN THE EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE

Co-authored with John Harris, published in Athanassoulis, N, ed. Philosophical Reflections on Medical Ethics. Palgrave MacMillan; 2005 Sep; pp. 88-108.